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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TECH-FLUID SERVICES, INC., : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs. : Cert. No. 
Category No. 13 
GAVILAN OPERATING INCORPORATED, : 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., 
et al. : 
Defendants/Respondents. : 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Court of Appeals err when it limited this 
Court's holding in Mollerup v. Storage Systems, International, 
569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977) requiring strict compliance with 
Rule 69 and held that substantial compliance is all that is 
necessary to redeem pursuant to Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure? 
II. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that 
the assignee of a redemption need only post the sale price to 
redeem from a lien foreclosure instead of paying the entire 
lien? 
OPINION ISSUED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is contained 
in 128 Utah Adv.Rep. 40. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals filed its decision and order 
affirming the judgment of the trial court on February 16, 
1990. This Court has jurisdiction over this petition pursuant 
to §78-2-2 (3) (a) which provides for appellate jurisdiction 
over "a judgment of the Court of Appeals." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Appellant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. is a 
corporation in the business of providing oil well services to 
wells in the eastern Utah area. (R.l) 
2. Paiute Oil and Walker Energy (not parties to this 
appeal) were the owner of mineral interests in the following 
described real property: (R.l) 
Section 13, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, 820 
FNL 932 FEL, Duchesne County, known as 
Paiute-Walker U3-ND-1. 
3. On August 16, 1984, Tech-Fluid provided services, 
equipment and labor to the Paiute well pursuant to contract 
between Tech-Fluid and Paiute Oil. 
4. Tech-Fluid provided material and labor worth 
$69,708.30. Paiute did not pay for any of the materials, 
labor or services rendered to it by Tech-Fluid. (R.2) 
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5. Tech-Fluid filed an Amended Notice of Lien with 
the Duchesne County Recorder's Office on November 30, 1984. 
(R.2) 
6. On January 24, 1984, Tech-Fluid filed a complaint 
to foreclose its lien. Paiute Oil, Sam Oil, Inc., Walker 
Energy, Duchesne County, and Gulf Oil Corp. were named as 
defendants. (R.l-6) 
7. On December 18, 1985, Paiute Oil & Mining 
Corporation filed a voluntary reorganization petition under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code with the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. All actions 
against Paiute were stayed by the filing of that Petition. 
8. On February 25, 1986, the District Court ordered 
that the answers of defendants Sam Oil, Inc., Walker Energy, 
Chevron USA, Inc. and Duchesne County be stricken and granted 
judgment of foreclosure of Tech-Fluid. (R.423-424) A copy of 
the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
9. Tech-Fluid obtained an order granting relief from 
the automatic say on May 18, 1987 as to Paiute Oil. (R.427) A 
copy of the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit WB." 
10. On May 20, 1987, Tech-Fluid obtained an order 
authorizing foreclosure and a public sale pursuant to the 
provisions of the Mechanic Lien Foreclosure Act. (R.426) 
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11. Tech-Fluid subsequently filed a notice of 
sheriff's sale and an execution in the amount of $86,943.64 
together with interest. (R.435) The property was sold July 2, 
1987 to Tech-Fluid for $4000. (R.443-444) 
12. On December 31, 1987, Paiute Oil, through a 
director Walter Davidson, purportedly assigned Paiute Oil's 
redemption rights to Wind River Resources Corporation. 
(R.462) A copy of the assignment is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C." 
13. The assignment has been purportedly acknowledged 
by an unidentified notary without a seal being apparent on the 
face of the copy. Exhibit "C" (R.462) 
14. On January 1, 1988, Wind River Resources served 
the following documents on an on duty dispatcher at the 
Duchesne County Sheriff's Office: 
Exhibit "D" - Cashier's check in the sum of $4310.00 
Exhibit "E" - Assignment of Rights of Redemption 
Exhibit "F" - Notice of Redemption 
Exhibit "G" - Sheriff's Redemption Certificate 
15. On January 8, 1988, plaintiff filed a motion for 
order to show cause why the Sheriff should not issue a deed to 
Tech-Fluid based upon an invalid redemption. (R.452-53) 
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16. The court issued an order to show cause to be 
heard on January 190, 1988 at 1:30 in the Duchesne County 
Courthouse. (R.454-55) 
17. The court held a hearing on January 19# 1988 on 
plaintiff's order to show cause. Counsel for Tech-Fluid and 
Wind River argued the case to the court and were given ten 
days to submit briefs. (R.456) 
18. The court issued its Ruling on February 5, 1988 
ruling that the assignment was valid, rights of redemption 
could not be executed upon and Wind River was entitled to 
redemption under Rule 69 because it had substantially complied 
with Rule 69. Finally, the court ordered that Tech-Fluid had 
no further interest in the well. (R.569-570) 
19. On February 10, 1988 Tech-Fluid filed a motion 
and accompanying memorandum of law pursuant to Rule 69(f)(3) 
objecting to the amount of money posted by Wind River. 
Tech-Fluid requested a hearing on its motion. (R.581-85) 
20. On February 11, 1988 plaintiff filed a Motion to 
Alter or Amend the ruling (R.572-73) raising the issues of 
whether plaintiff's lien is extinguished and whether the Court 
misapplied this Court's holding in J.A. Mollerup v. Storage 
Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). (R.572-80) 
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21. Wind River filed responses to plaintiff's motion 
and filed a motion for sanctions. (R.586-599) 
22. Plaintiff responded to Wind River's motion for 
sanctions (R.600-602) and replied to Wind River's responses to 
plaintiff's other motions. (R.603-608) Plaintiff filed a 
request for ruling on all motions before the Court. (R.609-610) 
23. On February 29, 1988 the court issued its Ruling 
denying all post hearing motions. (R.611) 
24. The court signed its Conclusions of Law and Order 
on February 29, 1988. (R.612-617) 
25. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on March 3, 
1988. (R.619-620) 
26. Subsequent to filing plaintiff's Notice of 
Appeal, defendant Wind River Resources sold its interest to 
Gavilan Operating Incorporated. 
27. On February 16, 1990, the Court of Appeals filed 
its opinion. The opinion can be found at 128 Utah Adv.Rep. 40. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals decision is in conflict with a 
previous decision of this Court when it held that Wind River ^  
substantially complied with the procedural requirements of m 
Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals 
erred when it held that Wind River substantially complied with 
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the provisions of Rule 69. "Substantial compliance" is not a 
basis for the court granting relief to Wind River absent some 
reason for the court to proceed in equity. This Court's 
decision in Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 
P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977) , mandates strict compliance with Rule 
69. Moreover, this Court's decision in United States v. 
Loosley, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976) is inapplicable to the facts 
of this case because Tech-Fluid engaged in no inequitable 
conduct justifying equitable relief. Because Wind River 
failed to strictly comply with Rule 69, the redemption is void 
and this Court should grant this petition. 
The Court of Appeals also erred when it held that Wind 
River posted the property amount to redeem. In order to 
redeem, Wind River must post the entire amount due on the lien 
with interest. Rule 69(f)(3) provides for payment of the 
entire lien in order to redeem under a lien foreclosure. In 
the alternative, if Wind River need only post the amount of 
the sale, then Tech-Fluid's lien is still in tact and 
Tech-Fluid may once again foreclose its lien. Redemption only 
stopped the sale and restored the debtor to its property as if 
there had been no sale. The property is therefore encumbered 
by the lien. The Court should grant this petition for 
certiorari to review and clarify this important rule of law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WIND RIVER RESOURCES' REDEMPTION WAS INVALID FOR 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 69(f), 
U.R.CIV.P. 
One of the central issues of this case was whether 
Wind River Resources complied with Rule 69(f)(2), U.R.Civ.P. 
when it purportedly redeemed under the lien foreclosure sale. 
The Court of Appeals held that a party seeking redemption need 
only substantially comply with the procedural requirements of 
Rule 69(f)(2) in order to redeem. The Court's decision is in 
conflict with this Court's ruling in Mollerup v. Storage 
Systems, International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977) where this 
Court held "the right of redemption has long been recognized 
as a substantive right to be exercised in strict accord with 
statutory terms." Ic[. at 1124 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69(f) governs the 
procedural requirements for a valid redemption. Rule 69(f)(2) 
provides: 
At the time of redemption the person seeking the 
same may make payment of the amount required to 
the person from whom the property is being 
redeemed, or for him to the officer who make the 
sale or his successor in office. At the same 
time the redemptioner must produce to the 
officer or person from whom he seeks to redeem, 
and serve with his notice to the officer: 
(Emphasis added) 
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(1) a certified copy of the docket of the 
judgment under which he claims the right 
to redeem; 
(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged or 
proved where the same is necessary to 
establish his claim; 
(3) an affidavit by himself or his agent 
showing the amount due on the lien. 
When Wind River filed for redemption it served upon a 
dispatcher at the Duchesne County Sheriff's Office the 
following documents: 
1) A copy of an Assignment of Rights (Exhibit E); 
2) A Notice of Redemption (Exhibit $\) : 
3) Sheriff's Certificate of Redemption (Exhibit G); 
and 
4) A cashier's check in the sum of $4310 (Exhibit D ) . 
Wind River filed no other documents. 
Wind River failed to file a certified copy of the 
order of foreclosure. Moreover, the (original document 
evidencing the assignment does not supply a recognizable 
notary seal or signature. Finally, Wind River failed to file 
an affidavit showing the amount due on the lien. 
The Court of Appeals noted these deficiencies in its 
opinion as follows: 
Wind River could have complied more fully in 
several respects. Although there was no 
judgment docketed, Wind River could have 
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submitted a copy of the court order directing 
sale of the well. Moreover, there are no facts 
in the record to suggest an excuse for the 
inadequate notarization of the assignment. 
Finally, Wind River would surely have submitted 
an affidavit stating the alleged amount due on 
the lien. 
Id. 128 Utah Adv.Rep. at 44 n.7 
Yet despite the above deficiencies, the Court held 
that Wind River has substantially complied with Rule 69(f)(2) 
and approved the substantial compliance rule. J^ d. 128 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 43 
The Court of Appeals erred in authorizing redemption 
because substantial compliance is not the standard this Court 
stated is the law regarding compliance with Rule 69. In 
Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 
1977), this Court held that a redemptor must strictly comply 
with the requirements of the statute. 
In Mollerup, the trial court extended the period of 
redemption beyond the six month period of redemption pursuant 
to two ex parte orders submitted by the redemptor under Rule 
69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Reversing, the Court held: 
The right of redemption has long been recognized 
as a substantive right to be exercised in strict 
accord with statutory terms. It is not an 
equitable right cured or regulated by principles 
of equity but, rather, is a creature of statute 
and depends entirely upon the provisions of the 
statute creating the right. 
Id. 569 P.2d at 1124 (Emphasis added) 
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Wind River's efforts to redeem clearly do not 
constitute strict compliance with the terms of the statute as 
mandated by this Court's decision in Mollerup, 
The Court of Appeals found that substantial compliance 
with Rule 69 is sufficient to establish a valid redemption. 
Assuming arguendo that the documents filed constitute 
substantial compliance, the redemption still is invalid under 
Mollerup because they were not in strict compliance with 
statute. The Court of Appeals relied upon this Court decision 
in United States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976) to 
support their conclusion that substantial compliance is 
sufficient to justify redemption. 
Loosley involved similar deficiencies as are present 
in this case with the exception that in this case Tech-Fluid 
is also challenging the validity of the assignment. The chief 
difference between this case and Loosley' s is that the 
creditor-purchaser knew of the deficiencies in Loosley and 
failed to notify the redemptor. The court sitting in equity 
held that the deficiencies were insufficient to defeat the 
redemption because the creditor-purchaser knew 24 hours prior 
to the expiration of the redemption period of the redemptor's 
technical deficiencies in the redemption. The creditor failed 
to inform the redemptors even after a phone call by the 
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redemptor asking if there were any deficiencies in the 
redemption, _Id. at 507. Under the facts of Loosley, the 
Court held that the trial court, sitting in equity, could 
grant the redemption despite the deficiencies due to the 
misconduct and waiver on the part of the creditor-mortgagee. 
Id. at 508. 
The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable 
from Loosley in that Tech-Fluid has no knowledge of the 
redemption until after the period to redeem had expired. This 
Court's decision in Mollerup specifically limits Loosley to 
instances where a court sitting in equity may grant relief for 
"fraud, accident, mistake or waiver as was found to exist in 
United States v. Loosley, Utah, 551 P.2d 506 (1976)." 
Mollerup, 569 P.2d at 1124. There are simply no facts in this 
case to move the conscience of the court to grant Wind River 
relief in equity as there was no fraud, accident, mistake or 
waiver on the part of Tech-Fluid. Mollerup mandates that Wind 
River's redemption be denied for failure to comply with Rule 
69(f). To allow redemption under these facts will render the 
requirements of Rule 69 advisory. 
Moreover, absent inequitable conduct on the part of 
the creditor, substantial compliance is a bad rule and may 
lead to further litigation over what constitutes substantial 
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compliance. This Court has frowned upon substantial 
compliance in recent cases construing the notice requirements 
of Utah's lien statute. In Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp., 660 
P.2d 721 (Utah 1983), the lien claimant filed a notice of lien 
that failed to contain the name of the person to whom the 
material was furnished and the notice lacked proper 
verification. This Court held the lien irivalid refusing to 
apply the doctrine of substantial compliance to the facts of 
that case. IcL at 722-723. See also, First Security Mortgage 
Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981) (where this Court 
rejected plaintiff's substantial compliance argument and held 
that proper verification of the lien notice was a mandatory 
condition precedent to creation of a valid lien.) 
Although substantial compliance has its place in the 
law to prevent creditors from engaging in inequitable conduct, 
it simply does not apply to the facts of this case. This 
Court should grant the Petition for Certiorari and reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals because the decision is in 
conflict with previous decisions of this Court. 
POINT II 
DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE 
ASSIGNEE OF A REDEMPTION NEED ONLY POST THE SALE PRICE TO 
REDEEM FROM A LIEN FORECLOSURE INSTEAD OF PAYING THE ENTIRE 
LIEN? 
As previously indicated, Tech-Fluid bid $4000 at the 
sale. Wind River Resources posted $4310 as redemption on the 
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well. This is not the proper amount in order to redeem 
pursuant to Rule 69(f)(3). Wind River must post the amount of 
the lien with interest. 
Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
The property may be redeemed from the purchaser 
within six months after the sale on paying the 
amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon . 
and, if the purchaser is also a creditor 
having a lien prior to that of the person 
seeking redemption, other than the judgment 
under which said purchase was made, the amount 
of such lien with interest. (Emphasis added) 
"Purchaser" means Tech-Fluid. In order to properly 
redeem, Wind River needed to pose the amount of the lien with 
interest. 
The Court of Appeals held that the underlined 
provision means that an assignee of the judgment debtor need 
only post the sale price to satisfy the debt and extinguish 
the lien. This conclusion is flawed because it fails to 
recognize the specific language in Rule 69(f)(5) which 
provides: "If the judgment debtor redeems he must make the 
same payments as are required to effect redemption by a 
creditor." 
Other courts looking at the issue have specifically 
held that the entire amount of the debt must be paid in order 
to redeem, not just the sale price. The seminal case is 
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Collins v, Riggs, 81 U.S. 491, 20 L.Ed.2d 723 (1872), wherein 
the Court held: 
To redeem property which has been sold under a 
mortgage for less than the mortgage debt, it is 
not sufficient to tender the amount of the 
sale. The whole mortgage debt must be tendered 
or paid into court. The party offering to 
redeem, proceeds upon the hypothesis that, as to 
him, the mortgage has never been foreclosed it 
is still in existence. Therefore he can only 
lift it by paying it. The money will be subject 
to distribution between the mortgagee and the 
purchaser, in equitable proportions, so as to 
reimburse the latter his purchase money and pay 
the former the balance of this debt. 
Id. at 81 U.S. at 498, 20 L.Ed.2d at 724. 
Numerous courts have adopted the Collins rule 
regarding the amount necessary for redemption. Sun First 
National Bank of Orlando v. R.G.G., 348 So.2d 621 (Fla App. 
1977); United States v. Brosnan, 264 F.2d 762, 766 (3rd Cir. 
1959); Garuich v. Associates Financial Services Co., 435 So.2d 
30 (Ala 1983) (when mortgagee buys at foreclosure sale the 
amount of the debt is treated as the purchase price rather 
than the amount bid.) 
This rule was codified in 28 U.S.C. 2410(d)(1) which 
requires the United States to post the amount of the debt, not 
just the sale price, if it wants to redeem property sold under 
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Policy reasons support this Court adopting the Collins 
rule. The creditor takes security for payment of the debt. 
Before the debtor should be entitled to redeem the property 
free and clear of the creditors lien, the underlying debt 
should be paid in full. All parties would obtain exactly what 
they were entitled to under their contractual rights and the 
debtors property rights are protected. 
The alternative would be to allow the debtor to redeem 
by paying the sale bid price but not extinguish the lien. 
This rule, although more cumbersome, appears to be the current 
rule of law regarding redemption. In Bennion v. Amoss, 530 
P.2d 810 (Utah 1975), this Court held that a redemption by the 
assignee of the judgment debtor "restores the property to the 
same condition as if no sale had been attempted." Ij3. at 
812. Rule 69(f)(5) provides "if the debtor redeems, the 
effect of the sale is terminated and he is restored to his 
estate." 
Thus a redemption terminates the effect of the sale 
leaving the property still encumbered by the Tech-Fluid lien. 
Tech-Fluid can at any time notice up a new sale to obtain the^ 
payment of its lien. Wind River argued the Tech-Fluid lien 
was extinguished by the sale. The above quoted language 
however shows that it was restored by redemption "as if no 
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sale had taken place." The better rule of law would require 
the debtor to post the entire amount of the lien in order to 
redeem and Tech-Fluid urges this Court to adopt that 
interpretation of Rule 69. This Court should grant the 
petition for certiorari to clarify this important point on law 
regarding interpretation of Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons appellant respectfully requests 
that the Court grant the petition for writ of certiorari to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this 16th day of March, 1990. 
McRAE & DeLA^D 
HARRY H/ SOUVALL 
Attotprey for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari to Clark B. Allred, McKeachnie, Allred & 
Bunnell, Attorneys for Respondent, 363 East Main, Vernal, 
Utah 84078 on this 16th day of March, 1990. 
Harry w. Souvall 
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BOrnbi-l" A 
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
(801) 789-1666 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERIVCES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., 
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY 
GROUP, CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., 
and DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body 
politic, 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 85-CV-13D 
This Court, having heretofore entered it's Order 
February 10, 1986, that defendants Sam Oil, Inc., Walker Energy 
Group, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. and Duchesne County, a body politic, 
within 10 days file proof with this Court of any evidence of 
ownership in that certain oil well and appurtenances thereto known 
as 13ND-1 and no proof of ownership having been filed therein by 
any of these defendants, IT IS ORDERED that their answers be 
stricken and that a judgment of foreclosure issue in favor of 
plaintiff as against said oil well. 
FILED 
04 >>-» L^ 
7th DISTRICT COURT DUCHESNE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FEB 25 1986 
R T W O H UAQCTT r u A 
This Court, having been advised that defendant 
Paiute Oil & Mining Corp. is under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Utah, plaintiff's 
rights as between this defendant will not be adjudicated at 
this time. 
DATED this fy/ day of February, 1986. 
BY THE COURT:: 
RICHARD C. DAVINDSON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a copy 
of the foregoing to the following on this 1~' day of February, 1986, 
Mr. Kent H. Murdock 
Attorney for Defendant Chevron 
P.O. Box 45383 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Dennis L. Draney 
Attorney for Duchesne County 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, UT 84021 
Brent V. Manning 
Attorney for Walker 
50 South Main Street, #900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes 
Attorney for Paiute 
311 South State, #280 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
042-i 
Mr. Roland F. Uresk 
Attorney for Sam Oil 
156 North 200 East 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
04..; 4* 
E*h»bi+ ft 
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERVICES, INC., 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., 
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY 
GROUP, CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., and 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body politic, 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 85-CV-13D 
A certified copy of the Release of Automatic Stay 
provisions of the U. S. Bankruptcy Act having been filed with 
this Order releasing the automatic stay provision as it may 
apply to Paiute Oil & Mining Corp., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
the Sheriff of Duchesne County post and conduct a public sale 
as provided for by law in the Mechanic Lien Foreclosure Act. 
DATED thi day of May, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
ihOlSTRlCTCOURTDOCHESN 
JJN4J 1937 
H06EH K. MAtttT i, Vjlerk 
DENNIS L. DRANEY 
District Court Judge 
Or^i 
L. A. DEVER, #0875 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Tech-Fluid 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In re: 
PAIUTE OIL AND MINING 
CORPORATION, 
Debtor. 
Bankruptcy No. 84C-02620 
(Chapter 7) 
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY 
AND ABANDONMENT 
The motion of Tech-Fluids for relief from automatic 
stay came before the Court; and no objections having been 
filed to the motions; and after filing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the automatic stay of Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code is terminated as to Tech-Fluids, effective upon entry of 
this Order. The trustee is ordered to abandon the bankrupt's 
interest in Well ND13-1. 
'"day May, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this 
~7~ 
A 
Rule 5^0;,'r/ Des -nation 
? Cierfc
 : - * ^ j to i.-u3r a copy 
-de/ into fhv rcurfs Order 8ook. 
tntry Into Order Book not necessary. 
u& c. 1 S T 1
 ^^li^r^^fc^^aop^dand T ° - ; 
;s a true and complete cop/ of a documen' ;. 
file in the United States Bankruptcy Coc 
for the District of Utah. 
Dated: *AV i 
_ . , Attest: , y, 
day. — / • /J. fat 
8 88? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
a copy of the Order in the Seventh Judicial District Court 
and a copy of the Certified Order Granting Relief From Automatic 
Stay and Abandonment to the following on this _ ^ g y d a y 
1987. 
Ms. Harriet E. Styler 
8 East Broadway, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mr. Richard Johns 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
04^o 
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ASSIGNMENT OF REDEMPTION RIGHTS 
sreby 
Utah 
n the 
edeem 
ursuan 
ervice 
Paiute Oil l^^jx^rfa^gfoyrgtion, a Utah corporation, 
assigns and conveys^to Wind River Resources Corporation, 
corporation, all of Paiute1s right, title and interest 
property described below, plus all of Paiute1s right to 
said property from the sale held on July 2, 1987 
t to an execution issued in the case of Tech-Fluid 
s, Inc. vs. Paiute Oil & Mining Corp., Civil No. 
5-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne 
ounty, State of Utah. Wind River Resources Corporation is 
ereby authorized to take any and all actions necessary to 
edeem said property on its own behalf in the stead of Paiute 
il & Mining Corporation. 
The property to be redeemed is described as follows: 
All operating and leasehold interest in 
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located 
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township 
3 South, Range 5 Westfl^buchesne County, 
Utah, together with all rights, privi-
leges, franchise, easements, equipment, 
machinery or appliances appurtenant 
thereto. 
EXECUTED the Zl^ day of /W«*. Lu^ 198T 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORPORATION 
By: \Mfe nk. CAs 
hfecAtP^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
day of cJs^isy-K*-, , 198]j^ _, personally 
(J^ra^ ^ i 6 ^ ; ^ f " whQ/ b e i n9 bY m e dulY 
that he is ^ fee A l^^C^Vbf^ of Paiute Oil & 
Corporation, and that this instrument was signed in 
On the 
appeared before me 
sworn, did say 
Mining 
behalf of
 Ksaid corporation by authority of its bylaws, and said 
acknowledged to ~\me that said 
corporation executed the 
My/Commission Expires: 
mm. 
&t\\b& O 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
"DUCHESNE COUNTY SHERIFF #« 
mmmmimmmm 
in 
Office No. 05c l a 
848452921 
Datt 12/31/87 
••4,310.0c** 
i 1 3 - N D - l WELL /WAtrySWife 
HA: Authorized Signature rtrwt Sccanly $mmk wf Uta* 
• :o25akot .aa» : a««i«&?5&? a i * a u s 2 S 2 i 
ASSIGNMENT OF REDEMPTION RIGHTS 
Paiute Oil &^(^J^^^£9^3I£tion' a Utah corporation, 
>reby assigns and conveys^to Wind River Resources Corporation, 
Utah corporation, all of Paiute1s right, title and interest 
\ the property described below, plus all of Paiute1s right to 
»deem said property from the sale held on July 2, 1987 
arsuant to an execution issued in the case of Tech-Fluid 
grvices, Inc. vs. Paiute Oil & Mining Corp., Civil No. 
5-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne 
Dunty, State of Utah. Wind River Resources Corporation is 
ereby authorized to take any and all actions necessary to 
edeem said property on its own behalf in the stead of Paiute 
il & Mining Corporation. 
The property to be redeemed is described as follows 
All operating and leasehold interest in 
the Paiute-Walker #13~ND-1 Well located 
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township 
3 South, Range 5 WestT^jDuchesne County, 
Utah, together with all rights, privi-
leges, franchise, easements, equipment, 
machinery or appliances appurtenant 
thereto. 
EXECUTED the %/** day of /W>V, /i/^* 198T 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORPORATION 
By: L hi fa ^k CAs 
\^lcAipK 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
) 
On the 
appeared before me 
sworn, did say, 
Mining 
day of cJs)>st<f\-\ 1st  f j,)* c*u *-i / 198^ , personally 
Uftpg. fc^ib3>/^ who, being by me duly 
t h a t he i s <fefee A < i^*£~<iTofc_ of Paiute Oil « 
Corporation/ and that this instrument was signed in 
behalf of .said corporation by authority of i t s bylaws, and said 
acknowledged to --\me that said 
corporation executed the 
My/Commission Expires; 
mm. 
txniQT Y-
NOTICE OF REDEMPTION 
TO: The Sheriff of Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on this date, Wind River 
Resources Corporation, a Utah corporation, redeemed the fol-
lowing property from your sale thereof to Tech-Fluid Services, 
Inc. on July 2, 1987 pursuant to an execution on a judgment 
rendered in the case of Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. vs. Paiute 
Oil & Mining Corp., et al, Civil Case No. 85-CV-13D in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State of 
Utah. The certificate of sale shows a purchase price of 
$4,000. This amount plus interest of $240 and posting costs of 
$70, for a total of $4,310 is hereby tendered to you in 
accordance with Rule 69(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The property redeemed is described as follows: 
All operating and leasehold interest in 
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located 
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township 
3 South, Range 5 West,^fDuchesne County, 
Utah, together with all rights, privi-
leges, franchise, easements, equipment, 
machinery or appliances appurtenant 
thereto. 
Wind River Resources Corporation claims the right to 
redeem the above property on the basis that it has received an 
assignment from the judgment debtor of the judgment debtor's 
redemption rights so that Wind River Resources Corporation is 
the successor in interest of the judgment debtor for purposes 
of redemption in accordance with Rule 69(f)(1) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Attached hereto and incorporated by 
reference is an assignment of said redemption rights from the 
judgment debtor. 
a IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Notice is executed on 
WIND RIVER RESOURCES CORPORATION 
3L ?&fcr> 
- 2 -
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
) 
:E?L i "who, bein< 
personally 
m g by me duly 
of Wind River 
appeared before me AT^N^V^^TE'-
sworn, did say, that he is the PkF^(b'C/<JT~ 
Resources Corporation, and that the attached Notice of Redemp-
tion was signed in b^alfvpf said corporation by authority of 
its bylaws, and said \ ^l\\M^^C\^^C- acknowledged to me 
that said corporation executed the same. 
A» 
Notary Publi 
It Resadmg at: 
My Commission Expires: 
'#f — 
t>nmT ^ 
SHERIFFS REDEMPTION CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned/ acting on behalf of the Sheriff of 
Duchesne County/ Utah/ hereby certifies that on this date I 
"received from Wind River Resources Corporation, a Utah corpora-
tion, the sum of $4,310 in full redemption of the tract of land 
and the property described below, from the sale thereof by the 
Sheriff of Duchesne County, Utah to Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. 
on July 2, 1987 pursuant to an execution issued on a judgment 
in Civil Case No. 85-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court of Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
The property redeemed is described as follows: 
All operating and leasehold interest in 
the Paiute-Walker I13-ND-1 Well located 
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township 
3 South, Range 5 West^lbuchesne County, 
Utah/ together with all rights/ privi-
leges, franchise, easements/ equipment, 
machinery or appliances appurtenant 
thereto. 
As support for and proof of its right to redeem, the 
redemptioner produced an assignment of redemption rights from 
the judgment debtor, Paiute Oil & Mining Corporation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this Certificate 
at Duchesne, Utah on *~^\ ^
 lKm < , 198B • 
J / 
\r.> ivk v.-> - ^ ', jQJu/^i t-rvy^ fv^A jCu7T7> ^ W -n i!U 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE 
ss. 
of (\) On the J day f (JuAU^y^vM , 198_£, p e r s o n a l l y 
appeared be fo re me k^VTfAicc^ HfttttiSOO vtpe"s igner of t h e above 
i n s t r u m e n t , who duly acknowledged t o me t h a t he executed t h e 
same. 
^   
^    
Notary Publi 
Residing a t^fcftCm.Om 
My Commission Expires 
f 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Tech-Fluid Services, Inc., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Gavilan Operating, Inc., 
Paiute Oil & Mining Corp., 
et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890067-CA 
F I L E D 
FEB 1&1990 
Seventh District, Duchesne County 
The Honorable Dennis L. Draney 
4oor*n 
J of th« Court 
ttarti fifcurt •< Appeals 
Attorneys: Harry H. Souvall and Robert M. McRae, Vernal, for 
Appellant 
Clark B. Allred and Gayle F. McKeachnie, Vernal, 
for Respondents 
Before Judges Bullock,1 Jackson, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. appeals from an 
adverse ruling concerning the redemption of property it 
purchased at a sheriff's sale. We affirm. 
Paiute Oil 
respondent Gavi 
in an oil and g 
Tech-Fluid Serv 
the well for wh 
a mechanics' li 
In January 1985 
its lien naming 
defendants. 
FACTS 
and Mining Corporation, the predecessor of 
Ian Operating, Inc., had an ownership interest 
as well located in Duchesne County. Appellant 
ices, Inc. supplied services and materials to 
ich it was not paid. In November 1984, it filed 
en on the well claiming that $69,708 was owing. 
, Tech-Fluid commenced an action to foreclose 
Paiute and several other entities as 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (1989). 
In December 1985/ Paiute filed a voluntary reorganization 
petition under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee 
was subsequently appointed. In February 1986, the state 
district court entered a judgment of foreclosure as against all 
of the defendants in the lien action except Paiute. Because of 
the pending bankruptcy, the district court specifically 
declined to adjudicate the claim as between Paiute and 
Tech-Fluid. 
In May 1987, Tech-Fluid obtained an order lifting the 
automatic stay as it applied to the lien action and ordering 
the trustee to abandon her interest in the well. Thereafter, 
Tech-Fluid obtained an order from the district court directing 
the sale of Paiute's interest in the well. No judgment of 
foreclosure against Paiute was ever entered or docketed prior 
to the court-ordered sale, a procedure which, while unorthodox, 
was never objected to by any party. A sheriff's sale of the 
well was held on July 2, 1987. Tech-Fluid was the only bidder 
at the sale and purchased the property with a $4,000 credit 
bid. 
In the fall of 1987, Tech-Fluid discovered that Paiute 
intended to assign its redemption right. Tech-Fluid demanded a 
quitclaim deed, but Paiute refused. On December 14, 1987, 
Tech-Fluid obtained from the county clerk a writ of execution 
instructing the sheriff to execute on Paiute's redemption 
right. A public sale of the redemption right was set for 
January 5, 1988. 
On December 31, 1987, Paiute assigned its redemption right 
to Wind River Resources Corporation. On January 1, 1988, the 
final day of the redemption period, Wind River exercised the 
right of redemption by delivering to the sheriff's office of 
Duchesne County 1) an inadequately notarized copy of the 
assignment of Paiute's right of redemption; 2) an acknowledged 
notice of redemption setting forth the calculation of the 
redemption amount, the property to be redeemed, and the basis 
for its right to redeem; and 3) a cashier's check in the amount 
of $4,310. The sheriff issued a sheriff's redemption 
certificate to Wind River. 
On January 5 and 6, Tech-Fluid attempted to proceed with 
the scheduled execution sale and purchase the redemption 
right. However, the sheriff would not accept Tech-Fluid's bid 
until the district court determined whether a redemption right 
could be subject to execution. 
On January 8, Tech-Fluid obtained an order directing the 
sheriff to show cause why he should not issue his deed to 
Tech-Fluid because of an invalid redemption by Wind River. The 
district court subsequently held a hearing on the order to show 
cause and ruled that 1) the assignment was valid, 2) the right 
of redemption could not be executed upon, 3) Wind River was 
entitled to redemption because it substantially complied with 
the statutory requirements for redemption, and 4) Tech-Fluid 
had no further interest in the well. Tech-Fluid filed a 
further motion, claiming that Wind River was required to pay 
not only the $4,000 but the entire amount of the lien. The 
motion was denied and the court signed its conclusions of law 
and order. Tech-Fluid brought this appeal. 
On appeal, Tech-Fluid raises several arguments. First, it 
argues that, although the trustee abandoned the well, she did 
not abandon the right to redeem the well in the event of 
foreclosure. If this were true, the assignment from Paiute to 
Wind River would be invalid because Paiute would have had no 
interest in the redemption right, which would have been held, 
until its expiration, by the trustee. Second, Tech-Fluid 
argues that the court erred in holding that it could not 
execute on the redemption right. Third, it argues that the 
redemption was unsuccessful because Wind River failed to 
strictly comply with the redemption statute. Finally, 
Tech-Fluid argues that Wind River was required to pay the 
entire amount of the lien before it could redeem the property. 
ABANDONMENT OF THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION 
Tech-Fluid argues that the trustee never abandoned her 
right to redeem the well2 and therefore Paiute had no right 
which it could assign to Wind River. On the other hand, 
Gavilan, as successor to Paiute, argues that when the trustee 
abandoned her interest in the well, she necessarily abandoned 
any right to redeem which might arise in the event of 
foreclosure. The trial court heard arguments from counsel at 
2. It is noteworthy that the trustee never claimed she had 
somehow retained the right to redeem Paiute1s interest in the 
well. On the contrary, we are presented with her affidavit 
stating she always considered the redemption right abandoned 
right along with the well. However, that affidavit was not 
submitted to the trial court, is introduced for the first time 
on appeal, and, therefore, is not part of the record properly 
before us. Accordingly, it plays no part in our decision. 
the order to show cause hearing. Subsequent to the hearing, 
the parties submitted memoranda to support their positions. 
The court ruled that the trustee had abandoned the well long 
before the redemption right arose. The evidence and the law 
support the district court's conclusion and therefore we affirm. 
Tech-Fluid concedes that a right of redemption is a 
property interest.3 Moreover/ it is clear that upon the 
filing of the bankruptcy proceeding/ the entire "bundle of 
rights" Paiute had in the well/ including its right to redeem 
in the event of any sale subject to Utah R. Civ. P. 69/ see 
note 3/ supra, became part of the bankruptcy estate.4 
However/ we do not agree that the trustee had to explicitly 
abandon her right of redemption for it to revert to the 
debtor,5 any more than she had to explicitly abandon other 
rights of ownership/ such as the right to collect royalties or 
the right to explore and develop or even the right of 
possession. 
According to the bankruptcy code# "the court may order the 
trustee to abandon any property of the estate that is 
burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value 
and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1989). Courts 
and commentators have recognized that once abandoned, "the 
3. A right of redemption is created in Utah by Rule 69(f) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides, in pertinent 
part/ that "[p]roperty sold subject to redemption/ or any part 
sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or 
their successors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor . . . ." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(1). "Successors in interest" clearly 
include assignees. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(2) (2). 
4. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, an estate is created 
which includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor 
in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541 (1979). According to Collier/ "[a]n equity of redemption" 
comes within the scope of 'all legal or equitable interests of 
the debtor in property.1" 4 W. Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy 
1f 541.07[3] (15th ed. 1989) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1979)). 
See also Layton v. Layton, 44 Utah 349# 140 P.2d 759/ 761 
(1943). 
5. Tech-Fluid relies upon § 554(d) of the bankruptcy code which 
states that "property of the estate thab is not abandoned . . . 
and that is not administered . . . remains property of the 
estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1989). 
property stands as if no bankruptcy had been filed and the 
debtor enjoys the same claim to it and interest in it as he 
held previous to the filing of bankruptcy." In re Cruseturner, 
8 Bankr. 581, 591 (D. Utah 1981) (emphasis added). "Thus, 
abandonment constitutes a divestfiturel of all interests in 
property that were property of the estate." 4 W. Collier, 
Collier on Bankruptcy 1f 554.02[2] (15th ed. 1989) (emphasis 
added). 
The trial court's conclusion in this case is consistent 
with Cruseturner and Collier. We see no reason why the right 
to redeem should be treated differently than any other property 
interest that the trustee has in the property prior to 
abandonment. On the contrary, it would be anomalous to view 
the right of redemption as an independent property interest 
which stayed with the trustee when she abandoned the property 
to which it pertained. The right to redeem is such that it can 
only be exercised after property has been sold at a foreclosure 
sale, and only those with an interest in the property at the 
time of the sale (or their successors in interest) have a right 
to redeem. See Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(1). See also Layton v. 
Thayne, 133 F.2d 287, 289 (10th Cir. 1943), cert, denied, 323 
U.S. 786 (1944). It is inconsistent to suggest that a trustee, 
having abandoned property and consequently being divested of 
all interest therein, would still retain a right to redeem, at 
least absent some expressed and unambiguous intent by the 
trustee to retain that right.6 We hold, therefore, that 
"divestiture of all interests in the property" includes 
divestiture of the trustee's right to redeem. 
Tech-Fluid points to no compelling authority inconsistent 
with the trial court's and our conclusion. On the other hand, 
although our attention has been drawn to no case deciding the 
precise issue before us, the Fourth Circuit has at least stated 
in dicta that when the trustee abandons her interest in 
property of the estate, "the property and the right of 
redemption remains in, or reverts to, the bankrupt." In re 
Webb, 54 F.2d 1065, 1067 (4th Cir. 1932). 
6. We need not decide whether the trustee could have 
specifically retained the right to redeem the property even 
while abandoning the property. The trustee in this case chose 
not to attempt to retain that right, see note 2, supra, and in 
the absence of any indication to that effect, the right to 
redeem automatically passed to Paiute upon abandonment of the 
well. 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the redemption 
right belonged to Paiute after the well was abandoned, and that 
Paiute could properly assign that right to Wind River, 
COMPLIANCE WITH REDEMPTION STATUTE 
The district court concluded that Wind River had only to 
comply substantially, rather than strictly, with the 
requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The court also concluded that Wind River had 
substantially complied with those requirements. We agree on 
both scores. 
Rule 69(f)(2) provides that, at the time of redemption, 
the redemptioner must produce to the officer or 
person from whom he seeks to redeem, and serve 
with his notice to the officer: (1) a certified 
copy of the docket of the judgment under which 
he claims the right to redeem, or, if he redeems 
upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of 
the record thereof certified by the recorder; 
(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged or 
proved where the same is necessary to establish 
his claim; (3) an affidavit by himself or his 
agent showing the amount then actually due on 
the lien. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(2). 
Tech-Fluid argues that the trial court erred when it 
applied a substantial compliance test to determine whether Wind 
River had properly redeemed. Tech-Fluid cites Mollerup v. 
Storage Sys. Int'l, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), and argues that 
strict compliance with the statutory requirements was 
necessary. In Mollerup, the Utah Supreme Court stated that 
H[t]he right of redemption has long been recognized as a 
substantive right to be exercised in strict accord with 
statutory terms." Xfi. at 1124. 
Gavilan, on the other hand, argues that substantial 
compliance with the requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) was sufficient 
under United States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976). In 
Loosley, the Court stated that 
statutes dealing with redemption are 
regarded as remedial in character and 
should be given liberal construction and 
application to permit a property owner who 
can pay his debts to do so, and thus make 
his creditor whole, and save his property. 
Therefore, if a debtor, acting in good 
faith, has substantially complied with the 
procedural requirements of the rule in such 
a manner that the lender mortgagee is not 
injured or adversely affected, and is 
getting what he is entitled to, the law will 
not aid in depriving the mortgagor of his 
property for mere falling short of exact 
compliance with technicalities. 
Id. at 508 (emphasis added). 
Mollerup and Loosley, though seemingly inconsistent, are 
readily reconciled. Very simply, not all redemption provisions 
are alike. Courts, in evaluating the necessity for strict 
compliance in these kinds of cases, focus upon the nature of 
the statutory requirements and the likelihood of prejudice. If 
failure to adhere to the requirements will affect a substantive 
right of one of the parties and possibly prejudice that party, 
then courts require strict compliance. On the other hand, if 
the requirements are merely procedural and will not prejudice 
one of the parties, substantial compliance is sufficient. 
The Washington Supreme Court addressed these distinctions 
directly in Gesa Fed. Credit Union v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.. 105 
Wash. 2d 248, 713 P.2d 728, 731-33 (1986) (en banc). The Gesa 
court recognized that the Washington redemption statute 
involved Ha number of provisions, some which confer a statutory 
right . . . and some of which establish a procedure by which 
that right is perfected . . . . fA statute is remedial when it 
relates to practice, procedure, or remedies and does not affect 
a substantive or vested right."* 713 P.2d at 732 (quoting 
Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wash. 2d 170, 685 P.2d 1074, 1081 
(1984)). The Gesa court went on to hold that the technical 
failure involved in that case was harmless because the failure 
did not affect a substantive right and appellant was not 
prejudiced. I£. at 732-33. £&£ also Household Fin. Corp. v. 
Bacon, 58 Or. App. 267, 648 P.2d 421, 423 (1982) (technical 
inconsistencies with statutory requirements did not adversely 
affect rights of purchaser). 
Our Supreme Court in Mollerup was construing Rule 69(f)(3) 
which sets a time limit of six months in which redemption must 
be made. This provision clearly affects a substantive right of 
the purchaser. All right, title and interest in the property do 
not vest in the purchaser at a foreclosure sale until the 
redemption period has expired. Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 
96 Utah 297, 85 P.2d 770, 772 (1938). "[T]he interest of the 
purchaser is [merely] an equitable interest, subject to be lost 
or cancelled or taken away by the debtor or any redemptioner or 
their assigns upon payment of the sale price with interest.H 85 
P.2d at 772. If there is no redemption within the prescribed 
period, the purchaser is then entitled to a conveyance of the 
property. Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(5). To allow redemption beyond 
the six-month period inevitably compromises and prejudices the 
purchaser's interest. Consequently, the Court concluded that 
absent some significant facts to -move the conscience" of the 
Court, it would not extend the redemption period. Mollerup, 569 
P.2d at 1124. 
Loosley, like the case before us, involved Rule 69(f)(2). 
A brief recitation of the facts in Loosley is helpful. The 
Loosleys failed to pay a government loan. The government then 
foreclosed on a property interest of the Loosleys. At a 
foreclosure sale, the Griffiths purchased the property 
interest. The Loosleys then assigned their right of redemption 
to the Hammons, who further assigned the right to Basic 
Investment, Inc. One day prior to the six-month redemption 
period, Basic served a notice of redemption on the Griffiths' 
attorney, accompanied with a check for the correct redemption 
amount. They did not serve any of the documents specified in 
Rule 69(f)(2). Eight days after the tender, the Griffiths 
returned the check and rejected the tender based upon Basic's 
failure to comply with Rule 69(f)(2). 
The trial court in Loosley concluded that because the 
Griffiths had failed to adhere to the requirements of Rule 
69(f)(2), their redemption failed. On appeal, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed. It recognized that the failure to comply with 
the technical requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) had no adverse 
effects on the Griffiths. 551 P.2d at 508. It then held that 
since the assignments were proper, the Griffiths had tendered 
the correct amount within the prescribed time, and the Loosleys 
had failed to object, the redemption was good. Id. 
Based upon the authority discussed above, and in particular 
Loosley, we affirm that substantial compliance is the proper 
test under Rule 69(f)(2). Moreover, because the Court found 
substantial compliance in Loosley, we are obliged to find it in 
this case. Tech-Fluid's position is even weaker than the 
Griffiths' position was in Loosley. Wind River not only 
tendered the correct amount within the redemption period but 
also tendered some proof of the assignment between Paiute and 
Wind River and a document entitled "Notice of Redemption" giving 
additional facts about its entitlement to redeem. Although Wind 
River could surely have done more to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 69(f)(2),7 it complied more fully than 
did the defendants in Loosley. Additionally, as in Loosley, 
Tech-Fluid did not challenge the validity of the tender until 
several days after the tender and after the redemption period 
had run. 
The requirements at issue in this case are identical to 
those in Loosley. They are procedural in nature and do not 
affect any substantive rights of the purchaser.8 Tech-Fluid 
has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the failure to 
strictly adhere to the requirements of Rule 69(f)(2). 
Consequently, we affirm the district court's holding that Wind 
River substantially complied with the redemption provisions and 
that such compliance is all that is necessary. 
EXECUTION ON REDEMPTION RIGHT 
Having concluded that Wind River otherwise properly 
redeemed, we now address whether Tech-Fluid could execute upon 
Paiute's redemption right. We hold that it could not. 
We need not address the more general issue of whether a 
judgment creditor could ever execute upon the judgment debtor's 
right of redemption because Tech-Fluid failed to obtain a 
foreclosure judgment upon which a post-foreclosure sale 
7. Wind River could have complied more fully in several 
respects. Although there was no judgment docketed. Wind River 
could have submitted a copy of the court order directing sale of 
the well. Moreover, there are no facts in the record to suggest 
an excuse for the inadequate notarization of the assignment. 
Finally/ Wind River could surely have submitted an affidavit 
stating the alleged amount due on the lien. 
8. The procedural rules of 69(f)(2) were likely created for the 
benefit and protection of the sheriff/ so that he may be guided 
in what to require to make certain that redemption is in order. 
See, e.g.f Household Fin. Corp. v. Bacon, 58 Or. App. 267, 648 
P.2d 421, 423 (1982). 
deficiency judgment could be based and absent such judgment, 
there was nothing on which any execution could be premised. 
When Tech-Fluid received relief from the automatic stay 
regarding the well, it immediately proceeded to obtain an order 
from the district court to sell Paiute's interest in the well. 
In its haste, Tech-Fluid did not first obtain a foreclosure 
judgment determining the correct amount owing. 
Under a normal foreclosure scenario,9 the judgment 
creditor first obtains a foreclosure judgment determining the 
correct amount due and owning. Then, property subject to the 
judgment is sold at a foreclosure sale. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
69(a)-(e). If the proceeds from the sale are inadequate to pay 
the entire amount determined in the foreclosure judgment, w[t]he 
clerk must, as a mere ministerial duty, enter a deficiency 
judgment against the [debtor]." First Nat'l Bank v. Haymond, 89 
Utah 151, 57 P.2d 1401, 1405 (1936). Without an initial 
foreclosure judgment, the clerk has no basis upon which to 
calculate a deficiency. Thus, the clerk cannot enter a 
deficiency judgment and absent such a judgment he or she cannot 
properly issue a writ of execution. Consequently, the clerk in 
this case improperly issued the writ of execution. 
Tech-Fluid should not now be heard to complain. It chose 
its own course of action by failing to first obtain a 
foreclosure judgment. We hold that Tech-Fluid was not entitled 
to execute upon Paiute's redemption right.10 
9. The mechanics' lien statute specifically provides that 
mechanics' liens are foreclosed in the same manner, and subject 
to the same right of redemption, as in the case of mortgages. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-15 (1988). 
10. Having based our conclusion on Tech-Fluid's failure to 
obtain a foreclosure judgment, we do not mean to suggest that 
Tech-Fluid would have prevailed had this fact been otherwise. 
There is apparently little case law addressing the issue of 
whether a mortgage creditor may execute on the redemption right 
of the mortgage debtor. However, Gavilan directs our attention 
to Johnson v. Zahn, 380 111. 320, 44 N.E.2d 15 (1942). In 
Johnson, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a lien did not 
attach to the judgment debtor's equity of redemption arising 
from the judgment creditor's deficiency judgment. 44 N.E.2d at 
19. 
AMOUNT OF REDEMPTION 
Finally, Tech-Fluid argues that Wind River was obligated to 
pay not only the amount of the bid but the entire amount of the 
alleged debt. Rule 69(f)(3) provides in pertinent part: 
The property may be redeemed from the 
purchaser . . . on paying the amount of 
his purchase with 6 percent thereon in 
addition . . . and, if the purchaser is 
also a creditor having a lien prior to 
that of the person seeking redemption, 
other than the judgment under which said 
purchase was made, the amount of such 
lien, with interest. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(f)(3) (emphasis added). Tech-Fluid does not 
claim to have had any lien on the well other than the one which 
permitted the original foreclosure sale. Under the express 
language of the statute, therefore, it was only entitled to the 
amount of the purchase bid plus six percent interest. See 
Madsen, Equitable Considerations of Mortgage Foreclosure and 
Redemption in Utah: A Need for Remedial Legislation, 1976 Utah 
L. Rev. 327, 343-44. 
Once again, Tech-Fluid is bound by its choices, including 
the decision to bid only $4,000 on the well. As the only bidder 
at the sale, Tech-Fluid established the value of the well for 
redemption purposes and placed itself in the predicament it now 
finds itself. See Kries v. Allen Carpet, Inc., 146 Ariz. 348, 
706 P.2d 360, 363-64 (1985) (en banc); Johnson v. Zahn, 380 111. 
320, 44 N.E.2d 15, 17 (1942). According to Rule 69(f)(3), Wind 
River was only obligated to pay what Tech Fluid paid plus the 
specified interest. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the rulings of the district court and hold that: 
1) The trustee abandoned her right of redemption when she 
abandoned the well; 2) Wind River substantially complied with 
the technical requirements of Rule 69(f)(2) and therefore 
properly redeemed; 3) having failed to obtain a foreclosure 
judgment, Tech-Fluid could not execute on the redemption right; 
and 4) Wind River was only obligated under Rule 69(f)(3) to 
tender^he amounts of the purchase plus interest. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
'ONCUR: 
Robert Bullock, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson^Judge 
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Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental there-
to. 
(a) Issuance of writ of execution. Process to enforce a judgment shall be 
by a writ of execution unless the court otherwise directs, which may issue at 
any time within eight years after the entry of judgment, (except an execution 
may be stayed pursuant to Rule 62) either in the county in which such judg-
ment was rendered, or in any county in which a transcript thereof has been 
filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court. Notwithstand-
ing the death of a party after judgment execution thereon may be issued, or 
such judgment may be enforced, as follows: 
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application of 
his executor or administrator, or successor in interest. 
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is for 
the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien 
thereon. 
ib) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of execu-
tion must be issued in the name of the state of Utah, sealed with the seal of 
the court and subscribed by the clerk. It may be issued to the sheriff of any 
county in the state (and may be issued at the same time to different counties) 
but where it requires the delivery of possession or sale of real property, it 
must be issued to the sheriff of the county where the property or some part 
thereof is situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personal 
property, it may be issued to a constable. It must intelligibly refer to the 
judgment, stating the court, the county where the same is entered or docketed, 
the names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for money, the amount 
thereof, and the amount actually due thereon. It shall be directed to the 
sheriff of the county in which it is to be executed in cases involving real 
property, and shall require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms 
of the writ; provided that if such writ is against the property of the judgment 
debtor generally it may direct the constable to satisfy the judgment, with 
interest, out of the personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient personal 
property cannot be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with 
interest, out of his real property. 
If the judgment requires the sale of property, the writ of execution shall 
recite such judgment, or the material parts thereof, and direct the officer to 
execute the judgment by making the sale and applying the proceeds in confor-
mity therewith. The judgment creditor may require a certified copy of the 
judgment to be served with the execution upon the party against whom the 
judgment was rendered, or upon the person or officer required thereby or by 
law to obey the same, and obedience thereto may be enforced by the court. 
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<c> When writ to be returned. The writ of execution shall be made return-
able at any time within two months after its receipt by the officer It bhall be 
returned to the court from which it issued, and when it is returned the clerk 
must attach it to the record 
(d) Service of the writ. Unless the execution otherwise directs, the officer 
must execute the writ against the property of the judgment debtor by levying 
on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient [property], collecting 
or selling the choses in action and selling the other property, and paying to 
the judgment creditor or his attorney so much of the proceeds as will satisfy 
the judgment Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and accruing 
costs must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by 
the judgment or order of the court. When there is more property of the judg-
ment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing costs 
within view of the officer, he must levy only on such part of the property as 
the judgment debtor may indicate, if the property indicated is amply sufficient 
to satisfy the judgment and costs 
When an officer has begun to serve an execution issued out of any court on 
or before the return day of such execution he may complete the service and 
return thereof after such return day If he shall have begun to serve an execu-
tion, and shall die or be incapable of completing the service and return 
thereof, the same may be completed by any other officer who might by law 
execute the same if delivered to him, and if the first officer shall not have 
made a certificate of his doings, the second officer shall certify whatever he 
shall find to have been done by the first, and shall add thereto a certificate of 
his own doings in completing the service 
(e) Proceedings on sale of property. 
(1) Notice. Before the sale of the property on execution notice thereof 
must be given as follows (1) in case of perishable property, by posting 
written notice of the time and place of sale in three public places of the 
precinct or city where the sale is to take place, for such a time as may be 
reasonable, considering the character and condition of the property <2) in 
case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in at least 
three public places of the precinct or city where the sale is to take place, 
for not less than 7 nor more than 14 days, (3) in case of real property, bv 
posting a similar notice, particularly describing the property, for 21 days, 
on the property to be sold, at the place of sale, and also in at least 3 public 
places of the precinct or city where the property to be sold is situated, and 
publishing a copy thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3 successive 
weeks immediately preceding the sale, in some newspaper published in 
the county, if there is one 
(2) Postponement. If at the time appointed for the sale of any real or 
personal property on execution the officer shall deem it expedient and for 
the interest of all persons concerned to postpone the sale for want of 
purchasers, or other sufficient cause, he may postpone the same from time 
to time, until the same shall be completed, and in every such case he shall 
make public declaration thereof at the time and place previously ap-
pointed for the sale, and if such postponement is for a longer time than 
one day, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original 
notice of such sale is required to be given 
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under execution must be 
made at auction to the highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock a m 
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and 5 o'clock p m After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the 
execution no more shall be sold Neither the officer holding the execution 
nor his deputy shall become a purchaser, or be interested in any purchase 
at such sale When the sale is of personal property capable of manual 
delivery it must be within view of those who attend the sale, and it must 
be sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price, and when 
the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels, 
they must be sold separately, or when a portion of such real property is 
claimed by a third person, and he requires it to be sold separately, such 
portion must be thus sold All sales of real property must be made at the 
courthouse of the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is 
situated The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the 
order in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such 
property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles which can 
be sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow such direc-
tions 
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be deemed an irrevo-
cable offer, and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for 
the property struck off to him at a sale under execution, the officer may 
again sell the property at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss is 
occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in addition to being liable 
on such bid, is guilty of a contempt of court and may be punished accord-
ingly When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his discre-
tion, thereafter reject any other bid of such person 
(5) Personal property. When the purchaser of any personal property 
pays the purchase money, the officer making the sale shall deliver the 
property to the purchaser (if such property is capable of manual delivery) 
and shall execute and deliver to him a certificate of sale and payment 
Such certificate shall state that all right, title and interest which the 
debtor had in and to such property on the day the execution or attach-
ment was levied, and any right, title and interest since acquired, is trans-
ferred to the purchaser 
(6) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give to 
the purchaser a certificate of sale, containing (1) a particular description 
of the real property sold, (2) the price paid by him for each lot or parcel if 
sold separately, (3) the whole price paid, (4) a statement to the effect that 
all right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and to the 
property is conveyed to the purchaser, provided that where such sale is 
subject to redemption that fact shall be stated also A duplicate of such 
certificate shall be filed for record bv the officer in the office of the re-
corder of the county The real property sold shall be subject to redemption, 
except where the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-years' unex-
pired term, in which event said sale is absolute 
(0 Redemption from sale. 
(1) Who may redeem. Property sold subject to redemption, or any part 
sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or their suc-
cessors in interest (1) the judgment debtor, (2) a creditor having a hen by 
judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or part 
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was sold 
(2) Redemption; how made. At the time of redemption the person 
seeking the same may make payment of the amount required to the 
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person from whom the property is being redeemed, or for him to the 
officer who made the sale, or his successor in office. At the same time the 
redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from whom he seeks to 
redeem, and serve with his notice to the officer: (Da certified copy of the 
docket of the judgment under which he claims the right to redeem, or, if 
he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record 
thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an assignment, properly acknowl-
edged or proved where the same is necessary to establish his claim; (3) an 
affidavit by himself or his agent showing the amount then actually due on 
the lien. 
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may be 
redeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on paying 
the amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon in addition, together 
with the amount of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for 
fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any im-
provements upon the property which the purchaser may have paid 
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such amounts, and, if the 
purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior to that of the person 
seeking redemption, other than the judgment under which said purchase 
was made, the amount of such lien, with interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded 
for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption 
may pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dis-
pute, to the court out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was 
issued, and at the same time file with the court a petition setting forth the 
item or items demanded to which he objects, together with his grounds of 
objection; and thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time for 
hearing of such objections. A copy of the petition and order fixing time for 
hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than two days before the 
day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the court shall enter an 
order determining the amount required for redemption. In the event an 
additional amount to that theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the 
person seeking redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount 
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper 
certificate of redemption upon being paid the amount required by the 
court for redemption. 
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property is redeemed by a credi-
tor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may, within 60 days 
after the last redemption and within six months after the sale, redeem the 
property from such last redemptioner in the same manner as provided in 
the preceding subdivision, upon paying the sum of such last redemption, 
with three percent thereon in addition and the amount of any assessment 
or tax, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary mainte-
nance, upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the property which 
the last redemptioner may have paid thereon, with interest on such 
amount, and, in addition, the amount of any lien held by such last re-
demptioner prior to his own, with interest. Written notice of any redemp-
tion shall be given to the officer and a duplicate filed with the recorder of 
the county. Similar notice shall be given of any taxes or assessments or 
any sums for fire insurance, and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair 
of any improvements upon the property, paid by the person redeeming, or 
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the amount of any hen acquired, other than upon which the redemption 
was made. Failure to file such notice shall relieve any subsequent re-
demptioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assessments, or other 
liens. 
(5) Where no redemption is made. If no redemption is made within 
six months after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a 
conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty days have elapsed and no 
other redemption by a creditor has been made and notice thereof has been 
given, the last redemptioner, or his assignee, is entitled to a sheriffs deed 
at the expiration of six months after the sale. If the judgment debtor 
redeems, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a 
redemption by a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of the sale is 
terminated and he is restored to his estate. Upon a redemption by the 
debtor, the person to whom the payment is made must execute and de-
liver to him a certificate of redemption, duly acknowledged. Such certifi-
cate must be filed and recorded in the office of the county recorder where 
the property is situated. 
(6) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the 
time of sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of his 
redemption until another redemption, is entitled to receive from the ten-
ant in possession the rents of the property sold or the value of the use and 
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits have been received by 
the judgment creditor or purchaser, or his or their assigns, from the prop-
erty thus sold preceding such redemption, tfye amounts of such rents and 
profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and if the 
redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the expiration of the time al-
lowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such purchaser or credi-
tor, or his assigns, a written and verified statement of the amounts of 
such rents and profits thus received, the period for redemption is ex-
tended five days after such sworn statement is given by such purchaser or 
his assigns to such redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser or his as-
signs shall for a period of one month from and after such demand, fail or 
refuse to give such statement, such redemptioner or debtor may, within 
sixty days after such demand, bring an action to compel an accounting 
and disclosure of such rents and profits, ar^ d until fifteen days from and 
after the final determination of such action the right of redemption is 
extended to such redemptioner or debtor. 
(g) Remedies of purchaser. 
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, 
the court may restrain the commission of waste on the property, upon 
motion, with or without notice, of the purchaser, or his successor in inter-
est. But it is not waste for the person in possession of the property at the 
time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, during the period al-
lowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the same manner in which it 
was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary course of husbandry, or to 
make the necessary repairs or buildings thereon or to use wood or timber 
on the property therefor, or for the repair of fences, or for fuel for his 
family while he occupies the property. After his estate has become abso-
lute, the purchaser or his successor in interest may maintain an action to 
recover damages for injury to the property by the tenant in possession 
after sale and before possession is delivered under the conveyance. 
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<2> Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of property or is 
dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom. Where, because of irregu-
larities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property 
sold was not subject to execution and sale, or because of the reversal or 
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of property sold on execution, or 
his successor in interest, fails to obtain the property or is dispossessed 
thereof or evicted therefrom, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall, 
on motion of such party and after such notice to the judgment creditor as 
the court may prescribe, enter judgment against such judgment creditor 
for the price paid by the purchaser, together with interest. In the alterna-
tive, if such purchaser or his successor in interest, fails to recover posses-
sion of any property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom in 
consequence of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale, or 
because the property sold was not subject to execution and sale, the court 
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party and after such 
notice to the judgment debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the 
original judgment in the name of the petitioner for the amount paid by 
such purchaser at the sale, with interest thereon from the time of pay-
ment at the same rate that the original judgment bore; and the judgment 
so revived shall have the same force and effect as would an original 
judgment of the date of the revival. 
(h) Contribution and reimbursement; how enforced. When upon an 
execution against several persons more than a pro rata part of the judgment is 
satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property of one, or one of them 
pays, without a sale, more than his proportion, and the right of contribution 
exists, he may compel such contribution from the others; and where a judg-
ment against several is upon an obligation of one or more as security for the 
others, and the surety has paid the amount or any part thereof, by sale of 
property or otherwise, he may require reimbursement from the principal. The 
person entitled to contribution or reimbursement shall, within one month 
after payment, or sale of his property in the event there is a sale, file in the 
court where the judgment was rendered a notice of such payment and his 
claim for contribution or reimbursement. Upon the filing of such notice the 
clerk must make an entry thereof in the margin of the docket which shall 
have the effect of a judgment against the other judgment debtors to the extent 
of their liability for contribution or reimbursement. 
fii Payment of judgment by person indebted to judgment debtor. Af-
ter the issuance of an execution and before its return, any person indebted to 
the judgment debtor may pay to the officer the amount of his debt, or so much 
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the officer's receipt is 
a sufficient discharge for the amount paid. 
(j) Where property is claimed by third person. If an officer shall proceed 
to levy any execution on any goods or chattels claimed by any person other 
than the defendant, or should he be requested by the judgment creditor so to 
do, such officer may require the judgment creditor to give an undertaking, 
with good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and damages that he may 
sustain by reason of the detention or sale of such property; and until such 
undertaking is given, the officer may refuse to proceed against such property. 
(k) Order for appearance of judgment debtor; arrest At any time 
when execution may issue on a judgment, the court from which an execution 
might issue shall, upon written motion of the judgment creditor, with or 
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without notice as the court may determine, issue an order requiring the judg-
ment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to appear before the court 
or a master at a specified time and place to answer concerning his or its 
property. A judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, may be 
required to attend outside the county in which he resides, but the court may 
make such order as to mileage and expenses as is just. The order may also 
restrain the judgment debtor from disposing of any nonexempt property pend-
ing the hearing. Upon the hearing such proceedings may be had for the appli-
cation of the property of the judgment debtor toward the satisfaction of the 
judgment as on execution against such property. 
In aid of an order requiring the attendance of the judgment debtor, the court 
may, upon satisfactory proof by affidavit or otherwise, that there is danger of 
the debtor's absconding, order the sheriff to arrest the debtor and bring him 
before the court, and may order such judgment debtor to enter into an under-
taking with sufficient sureties, that he will attend from time to time before 
the court or master, as may be directed during the pendency of the proceed-
ings and until the final determination thereof, and will not in the meantime 
dispose of any portion of his property not exempt from execution. In default of 
entering into such undertaking, he may b^ committed to jail. 
(1) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. At any time when execu-
tion may issue on a judgment, upon proof by affidavit or otherwise to the 
satisfaction of the court that any person or corporation has property of such 
judgment debtor or is indebted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, 
not exempt from execution, the court may order such person or corporation or 
any officer or agent thereof, to appear before the court or a master at a speci-
fied time and place to answer concerning the same. Witness fees and mileage, 
if any, may be awarded by the court. 
(m) Order prohibiting transfer of property. If it appears that a person 
or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be in-
debted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt from execu-
tion, claims an interest in the property adverse to such judgment debtor or 
denies such indebtedness, the court may order such person or corporation to 
refrain from transferring or otherwise disposing of such interest or debt until 
such time as may reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to bring 
an action to determine such interest or claim and prosecute the same to judg-
ment. Such order may be modified or vacated by the court at any time upon 
such terms as may be just. 
(n) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify in any 
proceedings brought under Subdivisions (k) and (1) of this rule in the same 
manner as upon the trial of an issue. 
(o) Order for property to be applied on judgment. The court or master 
may order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in 
the hands of such debtor, or any other person, or due to the judgment debtor, 
to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment. 
(p) Appointment of receiver. The court may appoint a receiver of the 
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, and may forbid 
any transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until its 
further order therein; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with 
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of his appointment 
shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which any real 
estate sought to be affected thereby is situated. 
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